Satori Acupuncture & Herbs · Second Spring
1970: the men’s trial stopped for harm. 2002: the women’s trial stopped for harm. Thirty-two years between the two verdicts on the same drug. The obvious question is the one nobody in the story wanted asked: why did it take so long?
The one thing
The honest answer is not “nobody knew.” Alarm bells rang the entire time: in medical journals, in congressional hearing rooms, in bestselling books, in at least one landmark FDA fight.
This is the record of who rang them, who ignored them, who finally forced the question, and who collected the bill. Names included, because the history is usually told without them, and the namelessness is part of how it took so long.
The mechanics
The Coronary Drug Project stopped its Premarin arms in men for cardiovascular harm, and the finding was set aside with a shrug that sounded reasonable in the room: the trial was in men, the customers were women, perhaps women’s bodies would respond differently. Notice the move. For decades, medicine had been comfortable applying male trial results to women when the results were useful, a habit whose full history I have told elsewhere. The one time a male trial returned bad news about a women’s drug, the difference between the sexes suddenly became decisive. Evidence was being sorted by convenience.
The second mechanism was structural: nothing required a real trial. Premarin was grandfathered into effectiveness, prevention claims grew on observational studies, and those studies were fatally flattered by the healthy-user effect: the women prescribed estrogen in those decades were disproportionately the well-off, well-fed, doctor-visiting women who were going to have healthier hearts anyway. The apparent 40 to 50 percent heart benefit in cohort studies was, in large part, a mirror reflecting who got prescriptions. It took until 2002 for a randomized trial to hold the mirror up and show nothing behind it. In between, the 1982 bone findings and the 1984 NIH osteoporosis consensus gave prevention prescribing an institutional blessing that no alarm ever quite dislodged.
The record
The New England Journal of Medicine publishes two studies in a single issue showing estrogen users developing endometrial cancer at four to fourteen times the background rate. Sales crash by half. The industry’s answer is the progestin patch and a rebuilt market.
The FDA requires a patient package insert for estrogens, only the second in American history after the pill’s. Industry and even physician organizations fight the idea that patients should receive written risk information directly, arguing it would confuse women. The women’s health movement fights back, and the leaflet survives. Every warning insert you have ever unfolded descends from this fight.
Barbara Seaman, the journalist whose 1969 book on the pill forced the 1970 Senate hearings and the first warning label ever placed on a prescription drug, publishes Women and the Crisis in Sex Hormones: menopausal estrogen is being sold decades ahead of its evidence. She spends the next twenty-five years being roughly right and largely unheeded.
The New England Journal runs two studies in the same issue reaching opposite conclusions on estrogen and the heart. The uncertainty is now printed in the profession’s flagship journal, in stereo. Prescribing barely flinches.
Wyeth asks the FDA to add heart-attack prevention to Premarin’s label. The National Women’s Health Network testifies against it: no randomized trial in women exists. The indication is never granted. The quiet hinge of the whole story: the moment the system finally says prove it.
The HERS trial finds no heart protection in women with existing heart disease, and early harm. The observational mirage begins to dissolve under randomized light.
The Women’s Health Initiative stops early. Thirty-two years after the men’s trial said the same word.
The Capitol
The proof needed money and law, and both came from identifiable people. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin held the 1970 pill hearings that Seaman’s book provoked. In 1990, the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues, co-chaired by Representatives Pat Schroeder of Colorado and Olympia Snowe of Maine, requested the government audit that exposed how completely women had been left out of federally funded research, and turned the finding into a scandal the NIH could not wait out. Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland pushed the funding and the institutional machinery, including the Office of Research on Women’s Health. Senator Edward Kennedy carried the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, which made the inclusion of women in federally funded trials the law. And inside the NIH, cardiologist Bernadine Healy, its first woman director, launched the Women’s Health Initiative in 1991, the trial that would finally answer the 1970 question in women’s own bodies.
The bill
When the WHI verdict landed, roughly 10,000 women sued, and the litigation consolidated in a federal courtroom in Little Rock, Arkansas, as MDL 1507, before Judge William R. Wilson Jr. The record answers the question of who led.
The women led, and their names belong in the story. Donna Scroggin of Little Rock, whose bellwether case produced a $27 million punitive verdict against Wyeth and Upjohn after a jury found she was inadequately warned that Premarin and Prempro carried breast cancer risk. Arlene Rowatt, Pamela Forrester, and Jeraldine Scofield of Nevada, whose Reno jury initially returned $134.5 million after finding the companies had misled the public about the risks; the award was cut on appeal, and Rowatt and Forrester both died of their cancers before the appeals finished. That detail is the litigation in miniature: the process outlived the plaintiffs.
The trial lawyers who carried the courtroom fight, most prominently, were Zoe Littlepage and Rainey Booth of Houston, who won a half-dozen verdicts against Wyeth across the country. Littlepage’s closing argument in the Nevada punitive phase compresses the plaintiffs’ entire theory into two sentences a jury had already endorsed: you found Wyeth acted with fraud and malice, and this is a company that decided year after year to put profits over the safety of patients who got breast cancer. It was the discovery process in these cases, boxes of internal documents pried loose by exactly this litigation, that exposed the ghostwriting operation later published in the medical literature. The lawsuits did not just compensate; they excavated.
Honest note: the early bellwethers, Reeves and Rush, produced defense verdicts, and Wyeth fought every loss up the appellate ladder. The verdicts that stuck changed the arithmetic.
The mechanism
Line the record up and the answer to “why so long” stops being a mystery and becomes a mechanism with parts. A harmful male trial dismissed because the customers were female. No law requiring the real trial, until 1993. Observational data flattered by healthy users, converted into confidence by marketing, and blessed by consensus statements. Alarm-ringers, mostly women, mostly outside the establishment, who were right early and ignored long. And a system that only produced the answer once specific people, most of them women, in Congress, at the NIH, in courtrooms, built the machinery that could produce it.
The thirty-two years were not an absence of knowledge. They were a surplus of permission.
Someone always knew. The question is who was required to act on the knowing, and in this story, for three decades, the answer was no one.
The tool
A history this dark should leave you with a tool, not just a mood. Understand what the thirty-two years reveal about how drug knowledge is actually made. A pre-approval trial runs a curated few thousand people for months to a couple of years; the harms that need a decade of exposure, or that live in one body in a thousand, are mathematically invisible to it. The real long-term study of every drug is run afterward, on the market, on customers, and this story is simply the largest example on record: six million women were on the combination the morning the trial stopped. That is not a scandal unique to Wyeth. It is the structure, and it is still the structure, which is why the newest menopause drugs, one and three years old, sit in the same position today that Premarin sat in for decades: confidence complete, long-term picture pending, takers unknowingly filling it in.
The quiet questions
When a headline says a new study shows a new drug works, ask these before the enthusiastic ones. How long did the trial run, against how long I would take this? Who was excluded? What did the placebo arm do? And who will be required to act if the answer changes in year nine?
I have written a companion piece on exactly how to read a drug study as a non-average patient, because that skill, more than any verdict against any company, is what the thirty-two years should have bought us.
The women in this story paid the tuition. The least we can do is take the class. The full history of the drug itself is told here.
References
Fugh-Berman, A. J. (2010). The haunting of medical journals: How ghostwriting sold “HRT.” PLoS Medicine, 7(9), e1000335.
Hulley, S., et al. (1998). Randomized trial of estrogen plus progestin for secondary prevention of coronary heart disease in postmenopausal women (HERS). JAMA, 280(7), 605–613.
In re: Prempro Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1507 (E.D. Ark.); Scroggin v. Wyeth; Rowatt v. Wyeth (2nd Jud. Dist. Ct. Nev., 2007).
National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (1993).
Seaman, B. (1969). The doctors’ case against the pill. Peter H. Wyden. Seaman, B., & Seaman, G. (1977). Women and the crisis in sex hormones. Rawson. Seaman, B. (2003). The greatest experiment ever performed on women. Hyperion.
Smith, D. C., et al. (1975). NEJM, 293(23), 1164–1167; Ziel, H. K., & Finkle, W. D. (1975). NEJM, 293(23), 1167–1170.
Stampfer, M. J., et al. (1985). NEJM, 313(17), 1044–1049; Wilson, P. W., et al. (1985). The Framingham Study. NEJM, 313(17), 1038–1043.
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1990). NIH: Problems in implementing policy on women in study populations (GAO/T-HRD-90-38).
Watkins, E. S. (2007). The estrogen elixir: A history of hormone replacement therapy in America. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Writing Group for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators. (2002). JAMA, 288(3), 321–333.
The whole story
Not an absence of knowledge. Someone always knew.
The question is who was required to act on the knowing. For three decades, the answer was no one. The people who changed that have names, and now you know them.
About
Hannah Zulueta
Hannah Zulueta is a Senior Intern at Pacific College of Health and Science, completing her doctorate in acupuncture and Chinese medicine. Before acupuncture school, and still alongside it, she works as a Certified Canine Nutritionist skilled in TCM dietetics for dogs. The through line is the same in both rooms: helping bodies, human and companion, find their ease. After a 20-year career in resort hospitality, she returned to school to bridge metabolic nutrition and TCM principles. When she’s not studying or formulating canine diets, you can find her on the trails.
The articles on this website are personal. They are her stories, observations, and opinions, not medical advice. We live in a time where you can look up almost anything. But access to information and knowing what to do with it are two different things. Her goal is simply to share her perspective, and to think out loud in a way that might be useful to you.
She also understands that acupuncture has an energetic quality to it. Who treats you matters. Her hope is that through her writing, you get a sense of who she is before you ever walk through the door, so that when you do, you’re already halfway there.
Hannah treats Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays at Pacific College of Health and Science. You can request her when you call 619-574-6932.
The information provided here is for educational purposes only. Hannah Zulueta is a future Doctor of Acupuncture, not your doctor. Please consult your physician before making any medical decisions.